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Abstract 
IT standards are subject to network effects which establish challenges concerning a successful diffu-
sion of standards. A renowned example is a mobile service provider trying to establish a network of 
customers while potential user often wait until the network is sufficiently large in terms of other users 
(direct network effect) or content available (indirect effect). Despite the potential benefits to adopters 
and providers, there is still much uncertainty on the differential impact of direct and indirect network 
effects on the diffusion of standards and their impact on successful diffusion strategies to establish a 
user base. Our research questions thus are: 
(a) …what are the adoption drivers of IT standards and 
(b) …how can providers influence these drivers to develop an installed base? 
Based on network effect theory, we propose a formal model that simultaneously considers the different 
effects of direct and indirect network effects on the diffusion of communication standards. Using com-
puter-based simulation we can show that IT providers could exploit the alternating impact of direct 
and indirect network effects at different diffusion stages to successfully establish an installed base. This 
has fundamental implications for the provider’s pricing and market strategy.  
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1 Introduction 
Communication standards and technologies exhibit potential benefits such as ubiquitous Internet and e-
mail access for each adopter. Yet, successful diffusion of these standards depends on the potential 
adopters’ expectations about adoption decisions of others and thereby the eventual market success, i.e. 
the path of diffusion of a new standard in the future. Thus, technology vendors have to find a way of 
attracting initial users to a standard that promises to be useful only if others are using it as well. While 
the single adopter has—in general—not the means to solve this coordination problem, the provider of a 
standard might be able to answer the question of how to establish an installed base of users. Or to put it 
more simply ”Which dominoes should be tipped to overcome the startup problem?” (Weitzel et al. 
2006), i.e. to generate sufficient network effects to initiate a bandwagon effect. While not all start-up 
problems appear to remain unsolved, network effect theory has not been too successful explaining ei-
ther failure or success. Accordingly, the main research questions addressed in this paper are 
(a) …what are the adoption drivers of communication standards and 
(b) …how can providers influence these drivers to develop an installed base? 
Drawing from the literature on network effects and diffusion of innovations (section 2), in section 3 a 
conceptual model of communication standards and service diffusion is developed and used for simula-
tion studies in section 4. There, the findings are incorporated into a simulation model mirroring the 
diffusion of a new standard, while at the same time focusing on the interplay between direct and indi-
rect network effects as main utility drivers.  
The proposed model allows for an explicit differentiation between direct and indirect network effects as 
utility drivers (from adopting a new communication standard) and can support service providers in 
terms of their decision concerning the pricing and bundling of their services. 
   
2 Theoretical foundation: standards and network effects 
The theory of positive network effects describes a positive relation between the number of users of a 
network good and its utility (Katz and Shapiro 1985) that is called network effect. In this context, the 
term “network” is often used to describe the network of users of certain technologies or communication 
standards (Besen and Farrell 1994). As network effects are externalities (Weitzel et al. 2000), interper-
sonal coordination problems occur that can result in unfavorable or unintended diffusion results (e.g., 
too small or too large adopter networks) (Hildebrand 1976).  
Network effects describe "the change in the benefit, or surplus, that an agent derives from a good when 
the number of other agents consuming the same kind of good changes" (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995; 
Thum 1995). Katz and Shapiro (1985) first differentiated between direct network effects in terms of the 
direct “physical effects” of being able to exchange information (also called horizontal compatibility) 
and indirect network effects, arising from interdependencies in the consumption of complementary 
goods (also called vertical compatibility as using one standard (like printer or DVD) requires others 
(like a computer or DVD player) (Chou and Shy 1990; Church and Gandal 1992; Teece 1987). Tele-
phones or fax machines are good examples of direct network effects: the more people use the technol-
ogy the more people I can reach with it and thus the more valuable the technology becomes to me. Indi-
rect networks effects, in contrast, require some complementarities; examples include computer operat-
ing systems and available application software, or video cassette recorder systems and the format of the 
tapes. This relation is sometimes called the "hardware-software-paradigm" (Katz and Shapiro 1985, 
424). Other sources of indirect network effects can be the availability of after sales services (support: 
automobile makes that are often sold will probably have a higher availability of different services than 
rare models (Katz and Shapiro 1985, 425; Katz and Shapiro 1986, 823), learning effects, uncertainties 
about future technology availability, or the existence of a market for used goods. 
   
Since network effect goods, unlike stand-alone goods, draw their main value from joint use with other 
adopters, the diffusion of such goods often fails to meet expectations. Theoretically speaking, the exis-
tence of a positive externality (i.e. network effect) implies networks that are too small. The reason is 
that the private benefits of adoption are smaller than the social benefits: individual adopters only con-
sider their own utility when deciding on joining a network (e.g. adopting the communication standard) 
but do not consider that joining would make the network more valuable to all other users at the same 
time. From the perspective of an individual standards adopter, the associated reluctance to adopt a 
standard can be explained in terms of incomplete information about the communication standard at the 
time of the adoption decision, heterogeneous preferences among potential adopters, or uncertainties 
about the adoption decision of the other market participants. As a consequence it is a dominant strategy 
for the individual to wait for others to adopt first instead of choosing a standard too early, since early 
adopters face the risk of finding themselves stranded in a standard that might turn out to be unsuccess-
ful later (Choi 1994). This start-up problem (Economides and Himmelberg 1995a; Farrell and Saloner 
1986; Katz and Shapiro 1985) can prevent any adoption at all of a network effect good, even if it is 
preferred by everyone. In network effect theory, this fundamental phenomenon is called a penguin ef-
fect1. A resulting challenge for network effect theory is thus to explain  
(a) …how to solve the start-up problem and  
(b) …what is the role of direct and indirect network effects  
during the diffusion of network effect goods. Existing adoption and diffusion models mostly do not 
consider direct and indirect network effects and their interplay in a very same model. However, espe-
cially their dynamic interplay seems to be pivotal in order to explain the diffusion of network effect 
goods such as mobile data communication standards successfully.  
                                                 
1 "Penguins who must enter the water to find food often delay doing so because they fear the presence of predators. Each 
would prefer the others to test the water first” (Farrell and Saloner 1986). 
   
3 Research model 
3.1 Model requirements and network effect theory extension 
While traditional network effect theory contributes greatly to the understanding of standards and com-
patibility issues (Cowan 1992; Economides 1998; Farrell and Saloner 1985; Farrell and Saloner 1992), 
externalities and positive feedback effects (Arthur 1990; Arthur 1996; Beck 2006; David 1994), critical 
mass phenomena (Economides and Himmelberg 1995a; Economides and Himmelberg 1995b), band-
wagon (Leibenstein 1950; Rohlfs 1974; Rohlfs 2003) or lock-in effects (Cowan 1990; Greenstein 
1993) associated with the evolution of networks, much research is still needed. This is especially true 
when trying to understand many observable real world phenomena, especially when trying to develop 
solutions to the aforementioned start-up and network establishing problems (Liebowitz and Margolis 
1994). In particular, the specific interaction of potential standard adopters within their personal socio-
economical environment is often neglected. This means that most research approaches assume identical 
network effects for all network participants, regardless of their type, interaction and network topology 
and “network embeddedness” (Weitzel et al. 2006). As a result, important phenomena of modern net-
work effect markets, such as the coexistence of different products despite strong network effects or the 
fact that strong players in communication networks force other participants to use a certain solution, 
cannot be sufficiently explained by the existing approaches (Liebowitz and Margolis 1994; Weitzel et 
al. 2000).  
Earlier research dealing with the start-up problem assumes some kind of early adopter or diffusion ini-
tiator benefiting most from a good or standard even with no or only few further adopters (Beck 2006). 
However, this concept is not applicable in the case of communication standards in the absence of any 
stand-alone benefit. Information systems-related approaches analyze the start-up and diffusion of com-
munication standards with network effects by using social science concepts such as social coherence or 
closeness. Relational closeness between agents in a social system is analyzed by using neural networks 
   
simulating a population of agents (Plouraboue et al. 1998) or stochastic simulations (Wendt and 
Westarp 2000) analyzing the patterns of diffusion for standards.  
A thorough review of the literature shows that the distinction between direct and indirect effects is 
commonplace in the introductions to most articles on network effects. Nevertheless, despite theoretical 
and empirical indications that their economic implications are quite different, the distinction is not car-
ried through to the models and analyses (Weitzel et al. 2000). Therefore, it appears promising to apply 
network effect theory to concrete cases as in the telecommunications application domain and at the 
same time extend the traditional view of network effects by differentiating between direct and indirect 
effects as diffusion drivers of communication standards in a single diffusion model. We thus need a 
model that incorporates  
(a) …the dynamic interplay between direct and indirect network effects, 
(b) … individual standardization costs and benefits (user view),  
(c) …network topology.  
Accordingly, in the next sections basic findings from network effect theory are extended and incorpo-
rated into a simulation model to analyze the importance and magnitude of the aforementioned factors in 
terms of the diffusion of communication standards.  
3.2 Model development 
The model developed in this section considers the features and aspects of the different standards re-
sponsible for the two sources of network effects as described in the previous sections.  
We assume a network of n independent agents already using a certain communication standard A. Each 
agent i has to decide in each period to continue to use A or to shift to a new (technologically superior) 
standard B. Based on their bounded and dynamically adapted information set constituted—among other 
   
things—from past technology adoption decisions made by their direct neighbors, agents can decide to 
adopt B in one period and drop it in the next. 
The agents use A resp. B to directly communicate with their nbi neighbors in the network2. Further, both 
offer complementary services whose value to the user does not depend on the communication stan-
dard’s diffusion in the personal network. Let us assume agents deciding on adopting mobile technology 
standards or more precisely i-mode which offers i-mail for direct communication (technologically su-
perior to SMS) and content services. While the user’s benefit from i-mail depends on the diffusion of i-
mode in her social network (direct network effects), the utility from content services is based on an 
overall sufficient diffusion (indirect network effects). Content providers (or more general: providers of 
complementary services) have to be globally attracted by a large user base before offering content and 
services via i-mode.  
The decision calculus of each agent is to evaluate the periodical benefit surplus using standard B in-
stead of A. This benefit surplus accrues from the additional capabilities and features offered by B, given 
that the local network (i.e. neighbors) also adopts it (direct network effects) resp. that the global net-
work (indirect network effects) adopts it. The benefit is reduced by stand-alone costs (e.g. basic fees) 
for adopting the new communication standard B. See (Beck et al. 2003) for a very early version of the 
model and a derivation of the simulation model parameters from cell phone contracts of German pro-
vider firms.  
Direct network effects: Using B, agent i gains a higher benefit from the new standard by communicat-
ing with any B capable neighbor j in comparison with using A (e.g. using MMS instead of SMS). The 
                                                 
2 To visualize the communication relation, agents and their relations can be described as nodes and edges in a graph. To 
create a close network topology, the participating agents are randomly located in a unit square. Afterwards, agent i activates 
a vectored communication to her nearest neighbors nbi in Euclidian distance. Such a graphic illustration represents the so-
cial network of agents and does not determine the geographical location (Weitzel et al. 2006). 
   
valued additional direct benefit Diju  is calculated as the difference of utility from using B BDiju
, and A 
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Analogous to the benefit, the additional direct costs Dijc  can be described as the additional costs of the 
communication relations between i and its neighbor j: ADij
BD
ij
D
ij ccc
,, −= . 
The resulting additional net benefit coefficient Dijnu is:  
( )ADijADijBDijBDijDijDijDij cucucunu ,,,, −−−=−=    (subject to: Dijnu ≥ 0)     (1) 
Indirect network effects: The model assumes a monotonously increasing relation between the diffu-
sion of a new technology in an existing network and the complementary services and content offered. 
Since no installed base of users of B is available at the very beginning, third-party providers are not 
necessarily willing to bear the risk of investing in complementary services content. However, without 
complementary offerings, potential users often will not decide to adopt (e.g., if no i-mode content is 
available), and a typical chicken and egg problem occurs. With close interdependencies between pro-
viders of complementary services and users (and among users), the network related benefit of B will 
occur only after a certain number of users have adopted (critical mass). After this vicious circle is even-
tually broken, the steadily increasing number of adopters and use of complementary services will moti-
vate further providers to augment their supply, which again leads to further network effect benefits. As 
the network grows, the ratio of achievable direct and indirect network benefits increases and varies 
with positive feedback to each other. A self-perpetuating network effect helix occurs (Beck et al. 2003). 
If we assume the new standard B to be backward compatible, the indirect network benefit is always 0≥  
for adopters of B. The resulting indirect network effect benefits per period accompanied by the use of 
the communication standard are therefore a function of the number of all standard adopters qtb  of any 
same standard q: 
   
For adopters of A: ( )AtANtiANti bUU ,,,, =  with costs ( )AtANtiANti bCC ,,,, =      (2) 
For adopters of B:  ( )BtBNiBNti bUU ,,, =   with costs ( )BtBNtiBNti bCC ,,,, =     (3) 
In the following, these functions are explicated by linear proportional functions3.  
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Using equations (4), the following indirect network effect net benefit coefficients can be derived: 
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In case of indirect network effects, the term “net benefit“ refers to the total benefit of complementary 
services of B while in the case of direct network effects, benefits are defined as the difference of the net 
benefit coefficient Dijnu (see equation 1) between A and B.  
The overall individual net benefit deriving from indirect network effects is defined as INEtiU , : 
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Because we assume backward compatibility of the new communication standard B to A, the value of 
indirect network effects is defined to be greater than 0. Table A1 in the appendix summarizes all used 
parameters. 
                                                 
3 Although a sigmoid form of the function curve seems to better reflect the potential diffusion path, analogous to a slow 
diffusion start at the beginning, followed by rapid growth and finally a saturation-like slower adoption, a linear function was 
chosen, since this reveals the dynamics between direct and indirect network effects we are focusing on in a better way. Fur-
thermore, using a sigmoid function would require a more complex parameterization making the traceability of the subse-
quent simulation studies more difficult. 
   
Decision Calculus: The overall benefit from adopting B is defined in equation 7: 
( ) INEti
NBj
j
D
ij
B
ti UxnuKU
i
,, +⋅+−= ∑
∈
    (7.1) 
subject to:  
{ }1;0∈jx  (binary indicator for the adoption of B by agent j)      (7.2) 
A
t
B
t bbn +=  (number of all network members)       (7.3) 
The adoption decision is based on uncertain and imperfect information about the adoption decision of 
other users, so adopter i has to estimate the adoption decisions of neighbor j. In the decentralized stan-
dardization model (Weitzel et al. 2006), the probability pij (eq. 8) describes agent i’s estimations that 
agent j will adopt a new standard. 
jji
jjji
ij nbc
Knbc
p ⋅
−⋅=     (8) 
Every communication edge ij between agent i and her neighbor j (with costs to be saved cij and nbi the 
numbers of neighbors) contributes to the amortization of the adoption costs K of the adopting agent i. 
The decentralized standardization model assumes that the initial standard adoption costs K and the 
variable communication costs cji are the only costs known to agent i regarding j’s adoption situation. 
Therefore agent i can assume that the edge ji is representative of all of j's edges. Combining all as-
sumed data, agent i can then develop the following estimator pij for the probability of technology adop-
tion on the part of agent j, where cji is equivalent to Dijnu . In addition to the decentralized standardiza-
tion model, in our model the heuristic estimation has additionally to consider the indirect network ef-
fect benefit resulting from the neighbor’s technology adoption decision. Therefore, the numerator in 
this model is extended to the expected indirect network effect net benefit of neighbor j ( [ ]INEjtUE ). 
[ ]
j
D
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jtjj
D
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ijt nbnu
UEKnbnu
p ⋅
+−⋅=     (9) 
   
If neighbor j uses B in the previous period, ijtp is set to 1. Agent i believes that it is implausible that 
neighbor j will switch the current chosen new standard in the next period back to A. Similar to the de-
centralized standardization model we assume that agent i has sufficient information about the direct net 
benefit components of her neighbors j regarding the communication linkage to i. Furthermore, the 
model assumes that i knows j’s benefits from potential indirect network effects or is at least able to 
form sufficient estimations about them4. 
Unlike direct network effects, the impact of indirect network effects depends on the total number of 
adopters. To forecast the adoption rate, concepts taken from diffusion theory such as relational and 
structural interaction patterns (neighborhood concept) to explain the diffusion of innovations have been 
incorporated in this model. This model is based on a restrictive estimation for adopters of standard B 
( Btb ) orientated on the installed base of B users in the previous period: 
[ ] 11 += −BtBt bbE     (10) 
The expected benefit of indirect network effects in period t is: 
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )( )BtANiANiBtBNiBNiINEti bncubcuUE 1,,1,,, −− −⋅−−⋅−=     (11) 
The decision calculus of a risk neutral agent i in period t depends on the estimated total benefit [ ]BtiUE , . 
If the benefit is > 0, then agent i will adopt communication standard B. Each agent can decide once per 
period t. The adoption calculus is: 
[ ] ( ) [ ]INEti
NBj
ijt
D
ijj
B
ti UEpnuKUE
i
., +⋅+−= ∑
∈
    (12) 
                                                 
4 The quality of estimating the partners’ net benefits from indirect network effects does only affect the estimation of the 
perceived adoption probability pijt regarding j’s adoption of the new standard. The less this probability reflects the actual 
intention of  neighbor j to adopt the new standard the more wrong decisions from the individuals’ perspectives will lead to 
either more or less adoption activities, depending on whether the agents form optimistic or pessimistic assumptions about 
their partners’ benefit components from adopting standard B. For the impact of alternative neighborhood concepts see 
(Weitzel et al. 2003). 
   
Provider strategies: Communication standard providers can determine different parameters, which 
drive or inhibit the diffusion of the standard. As one possible strategy, providers often drive indirect 
network effects by implementing a virtual base to attract adopters even without an established installed 
base of users. One approach to achieve such a virtual base is to subsidize providers of complementary 
content and services in early periods of market penetration (e.g., if a telecom provider starts to offer i-
mode to its customers). Due to the close relation between provision of content and services on the one 
hand and the number of users on the other hand, eligible adopters will use the virtual base as an estima-
tor for prospective indirect network effects. A dominant provider strategy is therefore the signaling of 
the hopefully increasing indirect network effect benefits that will accrue in the future as a result of im-
plementing a virtual base VB previous to the market launch. Implementing a virtual base can be de-
fined as the provider’s strategy to provoke (e.g. using monetary incentives) the same effect which 
would be caused by an actual installed base of actors not having appeared, yet. VB=100 means that the 
technology provider subsidizes content providers by a virtual base, corresponding to a real existing 
adopter network of 100 users of standard B, i.e., the amount of the subsidy corresponds to the revenue 
which the content provider would get from 100 users. Having such a subsidized number of content 
providers in place, a potential adopter can take VB into her adoption decision. As an example, Table 1 
provides a set of strategies for a telecom provider offering i-mode as new communication standard. 
Benefit drivers  
Stand-alone Direct network effects Indirect network effects 
Technology 
Integrating any stand-alone 
functionality in the i-mode 
browser (or in the device by 
product bundling) 
Increasing marginal utility of 
switching to i-mode, e.g., in-
creasing message capacity for 
images or movies 
Increasing marginal utility of 
switching to i-mode, e.g., provid-
ing unique browsing functionalities
Pricing Decreasing basic fee Decreasing costs for inter-customer communication 
Decreasing prices for using content 
and services 
Subsidizing 
 Subsidizing messages (e.g., 
offering a number of free mes-
sages per month) 
Subsidizing content and service 
providers to establish a virtual base 
(VB) 
 Table 1. Example: Strategy set for mobile service providers to attract potential adopters  
   
4 Simulation analysis 
In the following, the previously developed formal model is applied in simulation studies.The model has 
been implemented in Java 1.5. The following parameterization has been chosen: 
Demographics n = 100 actors inbi ∀= 5 (each actor has 5 communication partners) 
Direct network 
effects dijnu  
Normally distrib-
uted 
Mean varies between ( ) [ ]0.2;5.=dijnuμ  
variation coefficient = 0.2 
Indirect network 
effects Ninu  
Normally distrib-
uted 
Means vary between ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ]35.;003.;35.;004. ,, == ANiBNi nunu μμ  
variation coefficient = 0.2 
Stand-alone costs K = 5  
Table 2. Parameter setting for simulation studies5 
During the simulation runs, the parameter values are varied in incremental steps of .1 (nuD) and .02 
(nuN) allowing for a (ceteris paribus) sensitivity analysis. The virtual base VB was varied from 0 to 200 
between the different simulation runs and existed only in the first period (i.e. providers of complemen-
tary services were only subsidized in the first period). Each simulation run represents one communica-
tion network. Having generated the network topology, the agents’ behavior is simulated over multiple 
periods until a stationary state is reached (i.e. no more adoption activities).  
The results presented in this section are structured as follows: in a first step, we analyze what circum-
stances (combinations of different levels of net benefits from direct and indirect network effects) lead 
to an adoption of standard B or not. In the latter case, we analyze whether a virtual base can “heal” this 
start-up problem from the technology provider’s perspective. The second part will focus on a single 
simulation run to analyze and to visualize the impact of the network effect helix. The last section inves-
tigates the duration of the adoption process and the VB’s influence on it. 
 
                                                 
5 The initial parameters for the model represent the status quo of the German mobile service market and have been have 
been empirically gathered from contracts offered by providers to individual adopters. See (Beck et al. 2003) for details in-
cluding contract duration, base and variable fees. For the sensitivity analyses, parameter ranges have been chosen to capture 
the impact of all relevant model parameters. 
   
The effect of direct and indirect network effects  
The first simulation results presented in figure 1 depict the number of adopters of standard B at station-
ary state (stable equilibrium in the period after the last adoption activities). During the simulation, the 
expectations concerning the normally distributed direct and indirect additional benefits 
D
ijnu , ANinu
, , BNinu
,  have been varied (with BNinu
, > ANinu
,  and N iWAPN idemoiNi nununu ,, −=Δ − ). Further, the 
simulations were conducted for different levels of VB.  
bB
 
Figure 1. Numbers of adopters of B in the stationary state, depending on the net benefit parameters (with VB = 0) 
In figure 1, each data spot represents the result of a single simulation run. In a basic simulation with no 
virtual base (VB=0), two main sections and a small interfacial area can be identified. In the lower sec-
tion, nobody adopts B (lower left area of figure 1). The results are only marginally impacted by indirect 
network effects. On the other hand, if the direct network effect parameter [ ]DijnuE  is greater than 1.6, 
the network will be completely equipped with B as depicted in the figure in the upper right area. The 
most interesting region is the interfacial area around [ ] 5.1=DijnuE . Here, the typical dilemma known 
from standardization research appears, i.e. the start-up problem (penguin effect (Farrell and Saloner 
1986)) or tippy networks (Shapiro and Varian 1998). In this area, the frequency of mixed solutions (i.e. 
   
an only partial market penetration by B where only some agents adopt it) is highest. These mixed solu-
tions have a maximum of 226 adopters of B in the stationary state; more adopters will lead to tipping of 
the whole user base to standard B.  
The influence of NinuΔ  (indirect network effects) in this region determines the tippiness of the network 
(Arthur 1989; Besen and Farrell 1994; Shapiro and Varian 1998), which means that an increase of 
N
inuΔ  does not increase the number of B adopters (bB) in mixed networks but rather enforces the shift 
towards a B monopoly. Due to the low variance of marginal benefits (representing mostly homogenous 
interests of network participants), only a few mixed networks occur. For a sensitivity analysis, the 
variation coefficient was raised from .2 to .4, covering a larger heterogeneity of the individual utility 
parameters. As a result, the percentage of oligopoly solutions (“mixed networks”, see (Beck et al. 
2003) increases by factor 1.12, i.e. the simulation results react quite insensitively to modifying the vari-
ance.  
bB
bB
 
VB = 100 VB = 200 
Figure 2. Numbers of adopters of B in the stationary state, depending on the net benefit parameters, for different 
sizes of virtual bases VB 
If the provider of standard B supports a virtual base (VB=100 and VB=200), further diffusion activities 
are triggered, as displayed in figure 2. With the implementation of a virtual base of VB = 200, the net-
work switches completely to B, even if the benefit from direct network effects is only marginal 
   
( [ ] 0.0→DijnuE ) while the indirect network effects are sizable. In contrast to a rollout of B without an 
installed VB, where exclusively direct network effects are responsible for the market penetration, a piv-
otal element for a successful diffusion of B with VB are the indirect network effect benefits of A 
( ANinu
, ) as shown in figure 3 with ANinu
, , BNinu
, , and Dijnu  as decision variables of potential adopters of 
B. In figure 3, the scatter plots provide all parameter constellations of ANinu
, , BNinu
, , and Dijnu  which 
lead to a complete diffusion of B under a certain parameterization for different VB.   
μ(nuN,A)
μ(nuN,B)
 μ(nuN,A)
μ(nuN,B)
μ(nuN,A)
μ(nuN,B)
 
VB = 0 VB = 100 VB = 200 
Figure 3. Parameter constellations, leading to a network-wide adoption of standard B 
Consequently, the interfacial areas in figure 2 for NinuΔ = [0.02, 0.03] are caused by different levels of 
AN
inu
, : the higher the indirect network effects benefit deriving from the usage of standard A, the less 
likely it is that users of A will adopt B, although their benefit would also increase with B.   
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Figure 4. Relative frequency of B-networks for different VB and direct network effects 
By combining the direct (bidirectional data communication) and indirect (services and content, pro-
vided upfront as VB) network effect benefits in one diagram (figure 4), a technology provider can chose 
   
which setscrews have to be adjusted to reach a certain level of diffusion of the new standard B. Each 
frequency level can be seen as the combinations of Dijnu  and VB (isoquants) which may substitute each 
other on the same isoquant (as range for technology providers to choose their strategy, aiming at a cer-
tain market penetration) to switch a network consisting of solely A-users into a B-network. 
The analysis allows a clear insight into the interdependent impact of the different setscrews on the mar-
ket penetration by B. Without subsidizing any providers of complementary services, the direct effects 
are the only available force that can launch the diffusion process, while indirect network effects help to 
ensure market penetration. By using the subsidizing strategy (VB>0) the technology provider will in-
crease the importance of indirect network effects which can partly substitute the impact of direct net-
work effects. The substitution rate between the impact of direct and indirect network effects in the sta-
tionary state is moderated by the level of the initial virtual base.  
User view of adoption process and network effect helix 
In the following, we will focus on particular simulation runs to investigate the role and interplay of 
direct and indirect effects on an agents’ adoption behavior from a potential user’s view over time. 
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Figure 5. Diffusion process of B vs. A (VB = 0 in both cases) 
Figure 5 provides two exemplary diffusion paths over time, which lead to different results but are based 
on an almost identical parameterization. In the left scenario, the network switches completely to B, 
while in the right scenario (where only NinuΔ  is marginally lower), an oligopolistic equilibrium appears, 
although the diffusion process is almost identical for the first 20 periods. The differences are produced 
   
by some resulting marginal deviations in the local adoption behavior. They match with (Arthur 1989) 
who states micro-behavior leading to unpredictable system behavior in the presence of network effects. 
The diagrams in figure 6 illustrate the expected average user benefit (neglecting setup costs), based on 
direct and indirect network effects ( [ ]INEiUE ), visualizing the network effect helix character. The left 
diagram depicts a scenario with VB=0, while in the right scenario the diffusion process is driven by a 
virtual base of 100. In the first case, the diffusion process is only driven by the expected direct network 
benefits, which are not strong enough to establish standard B network-wide, but only among 16 adopt-
ers. In the second case, the virtual base is responsible for immediately accessible indirect network ef-
fects, high enough to trigger a network-wide diffusion process. In the second period, the estimated indi-
rect network effects are decreasing because some agents assume that content providers will leave the 
market after the ending of the subsidies in the second period. This contradictory effect can be over-
compensated by increasing direct effects, which again push the indirect network effects [ ]INEiUE  in the 
following periods. Nevertheless, the stationary state is reached after five periods. As argued earlier in 
this paper, different network effects may have different impacts (in strength and direction) on diffusion 
behavior, which should be reconsidered and structurally analyzed by technology providers when devel-
oping pricing strategies. 
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Figure 6. Diffusion process and progression of net benefit, based on direct and indirect network effects for an exem-
plary parameterization with VB = 0 (left) and VB = 100 (right) 
 
   
Summary of the Results 
The results of the simulation analyses are summarized in Figure 1. In the head row, we distinguish be-
tween the two scenarios of a minor virtual base and a high virtual base (VB ≥ 200 in the simulations). 
The different rows present the results in different phases of the diffusion process. If no virtual base is 
apparent, the impacts of direct and indirect network effects can be handled separately. While direct 
network effects provide a huge impact on both the “strength” and the speed of the diffusion process, 
indirect network effects do not play a role, even in later phases of the diffusion process, and they do not 
accelerate the diffusion process. Slightly increasing the virtual base accelerates the diffusion. 
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Figure 7. Diffusion scenarios for different communication standards 
The situation changes if a high virtual base is implemented, e.g. by subsidizing providers of comple-
mentary services. Of course, the impact of direct network effects remains constantly high, but the im-
pact of indirect network effects not only becomes stronger but it also becomes dependent on the level 
of direct network effects. The higher the direct network effects the higher is the impact of indirect net-
work effects, which due to the virtual base are significantly higher than in a scenario without a virtual 
base. As a further effect, implementing a virtual base moderately accelerates the diffusion process, but 
not as strong as direct network effects do.  
   
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
When introducing a new communication standard, the significant influence of direct network effects 
(communication) is often neglected in early diffusion stages and the dynamic interplay with indirect 
effects (complementary services) is not analyzed systematically. We recommend that management has 
to leverage both effects in the appropriate phases in network effect markets. Based on the model intro-
duced in this paper, the simulations show that for fostering standard diffusion and thereby, among oth-
ers, overcoming the notorious startup problem, the provider should also consider the changing ratio and 
magnitude of direct and indirect network effects. In addition to the conventional wisdom of applying 
low price strategies for successful market rollouts equivalent to low communication prices in the be-
ginning until an installed base of users is established, providers have to orchestrate the next wave of 
network growth by focusing on complementary services resp. indirect network effects. Thus, nurturing 
direct network effects at the very beginning is important but not necessarily sufficient, thus manage-
ment has to focus on indirect network effects. We call this fundamental network phenomenon—where 
direct and indirect network effects amplify the number of adopters and stabilize the ongoing diffusion 
process—the network effect helix. By applying the model, technology providers can analyze various 
diffusion scenarios in order to identify interesting and promising market and price strategies for their 
planned services.  
In many markets, provider strategies have often focused on strategically promoting complementary 
services as the main diffusion driver while ignoring the importance of direct network effects (e.g. in 
mobile communication). In fact, as the simulation results have revealed, establishing a subsidized base 
of providers of complementary services—even without any existing adopter of the new standard—is 
important for a successful market rollout. But, the virtual base as strategic instrument loses its strategic 
importance after the market introduction. At that point, the users’ estimates of future direct and indirect 
network effect benefits predominate. While indirect network effects certainly are of great importance 
   
for the ongoing diffusion process, the possibility of direct bidirectional communication (direct network 
effect) is initially at least as important as a subsidized base of providers of complementary services.  
For example, in the case of the i-mode launch in Germany, the telecom provider subsidized 70 i-mode 
service and content providers. Due to an unsatisfying adoption rate of i-mode in the early phase, the 
provider reduced the price for i-mail (as source of direct network effects) significantly. Afterwards, the 
initially slow diffusion process accelerated in 2004 quadrupling the number of i-mode subscribers in 
Germany from 191,000 to 855,000. Apparently, the changed market strategy has been highly effective 
in penetrating the mobile market.  
In a next step, we will validate the model and result with empirical data from different real diffusion 
scenarios, as the already referred i-mode diffusion (against WAP) in Germany, or the advent of UMTS 
technology and services. Especially the i-mode diffusion, together with the rollout strategies, which 
were chosen by the telecom provider in the past, seems to—to a certain degree—yield a first validation 
of our results.  
In future research, the model will be extended by further important factors such as market heterogene-
ity, users’ risk preferences, different degrees of compatibility, or different types of diffusion functions.  
The main contribution of this research is thus to provide strategic decision support or building blocks 
for a better and more systematic understanding of the dynamics of value drivers in networks. The 
model, and simulations based on it, can support the development and evaluation of a variety of com-
munication networks and thereby contribute to establishing a networked infrastructure in different do-
mains.  
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Appendix 
 communication standard A communication standard B 
Number of communication standard 
users (installed base) in period t 
A
tb  
B
tb  
Fixed (additional) fee for using B 
(per agent and period) (stand-alone 
costs) 
 K  
Additional utility from direct net-
work effects after adopting B (per 
link and period) 
 AD
ij
BD
ij
D
ij uuu
,, −=  
Additional costs from direct network 
effects after adopting B (per link and 
period) 
 AD
ij
BD
ij
D
ij ccc
,, −=  
Direct network effect net benefit 
resulting from adopting B (per link 
and period) 
 
( )ADijADijBDijBDij
D
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,,,, −−−
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Indirect network effect benefit per 
actor and period based on the num-
ber of adopters (installed base) 
( )AtANtiANti bUU ,,,, =  ( )BtBNiBNti bUU ,,, =  
Indirect network effect costs per 
actor and period based on the num-
ber of adopters (installed base) 
( )AtANtiANti bCC ,,,, =  ( )BtBNtiBNti bCC ,,,, =  
Indirect network effect net benefit 
coefficient per period based on the 
number of adopters (installed base) 
AN
i
AN
i
AN
i cunu
,,, −=  BNiBNiBNi cunu ,,, −=  
  General Parameters 
 n = number of actors nbi = number of communication 
partners of actor  i 
 VB = size of the virtual base subi = substitution rate of actor i  
Table A1: Model parameters 
